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POINT I 
PRESENTENCE MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW PLEAS OF GUILTY 
ARE TO BE LIBERALLY GRANTED 
The appellee correctly states that the standard of review in 
this case is whether the Court has abused its discretion in denying 
the appellant's presentence motion for withdrawal of his guilty 
pleas. The appellee then incorrectly cites a number of cases to 
define an abuse of discretion. The cases cited by the appellee do 
not define an abuse of discretion where the defendant has made a 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In fact, a number of 
the cases cited by the appellee have nothing to do with guilty 
pleas at all. 
In a number of cased cited by the appellee the defendant's 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea was made during or after 
sentencing, not as in the instant case where the motion was made 
prior to the court's imposition of sentence. State v. Gallegos 748 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987) is. a case where the issue was whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant's 
presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. In Gallegos the 
court stated that in considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
the trial court is to determine whether the reasons offered for the 
withdrawal "show a fair and just reason for granting leave to 
withdraw the plea". Id. at 1042. 
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The lesson of Gallecros is that a court abuses its discretion 
in denying a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the 
defendant has shown fair and just reason. In the instant case the 
defendant has shown a fair and just reason why his plea was not 
voluntary. The defendants thought process was assaulted by 
constant pressure from his attorney and then his family, to do what 
he did not want to do. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S IN-COURT DEMEANOR DEMONSTRATES 
THAT HIS PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY AND COERCED 
The appellee cites a number of cases for the proposition that 
this court should defer to the trial court's judgment. The 
appellee points out that the trial court had the opportunity to 
observe the defendant's demeanor at the change of plea hearing. A 
review of the transcript demonstrates that the defendant's plea of 
guilty was not voluntary and was at most a momentary lapse of the 
defendant's otherwise steadfast intention to cling by his plea of 
not guilty and proceed to trial. 
At the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw plea of 
guilty, the defendant testified that at the change of plea hearing 
"his attorney poked him in the side and said, *Don, speak up and 
make the judge think you really want to do this'11. This testimony 
of the defendant as to his uncertainty at the change of plea 
hearing is made indisputable by the testimony offered by his 
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counsel. At the hearing the appellee called the defendant's former 
counsel as a witness. At this hearing the defendant's former 
counsel testified that at the change of plea hearing 
"(a) He had ^strongly urged' the appellant to 
plead guilty, to the extent of poking Don with 
his elbow in an attempt to get the appellant 
to unequivocally plead. 1.-100,101; (b) The 
appellant had always been hesitant to plead 
guilty, even up to an hour before the hearing 
was to convene. T-85; (c) The appellant had 
often spoken of taking the case to trial. 
T.94. 
The testimony of the defendant's former counsel makes clear that 
even as the defendant appeared before the court and told the court 
that he understood his rights and decided to plead guilty, his 
demeanor told another story. As the defendant had to be physically 
coaxed by and (literally) elbowed in the stomach, his demeanor 
belied the true involuntary nature of his plea. 
POINT III 
JUSTICE BEFORE ECONOMY 
The appellant cites United States v. Stitzer. 785 F.2d 1506 
(11th Cir. 1986) for a number of propositions, one of which is that 
the trial court's decision should be affirmed in the name of 
judicial economy. Stitzer. like the instant case, involved a trial 
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. That is 
the only similarity. In Stitzer. a number of defendants were on 
trial for the inception and/or participation in a cocaine sales 
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network. Once the trial had commenced, one of the defendants, 
Baldwin, told his lawyer that he wished to negotiate a plea. 
Baldwin's lawyer did two things; first, he notified the court of 
his client's wish to enter a plea. Secondly, Baldwin's attorney 
informed the court of his own concern that Baldwin had been 
threatened or coerced by one of the co-defendant's attorneys to 
enter a plea. At the change of plea hearing the trial judge was 
concerned, due to Baldwin's counsel's belief that Baldwin had been 
coerced. To address this concern, the judge asked Baldwin several 
pointed questions as to whether he had been threatened to enter a 
plea by one of the attorneys. Each time Baldwin indicated that he 
had not been threatened. Baldwin's plea was accepted as voluntary 
and the trial of the other defendants proceeded without Baldwin. 
Baldwin then filed a presentence motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The motion was denied. The appellate court's affirmation of 
the trial court's denial of Baldwin's motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea rests on two premises. First, where there was concern that 
Baldwin had been threatened, the trial court properly made repeated 
inquiries to make certain that Baldwin's plea was not the result of 
a threat. Secondly, the court determined that re-trying Baldwin 
would be a "prodigal" use of judicial resources. 
There are a number of differences between Stitzer and the 
instant case. Baldwin was repeatedly questioned to make certain he 
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was acting pursuant to his will. In the instant case, the 
defendant had to be physically prodded in order to respond to 
questioning concerning the voluntariness of his plea. Despite the 
defendants apparent reluctance, the court made no further 
inquiries. In light of the fact that Baldwin's plea was made 
during the trial, and as the trial went on for a month with the 
remaining defendants, and as the court had found that Baldwin was 
the central figure in the conspiracy, judicial economy may have 
been an appropriate consideration. While judicial economy may be 
an appropriate consideration in some circumstances, it must never 
overshadow a defendant's precious constitutional rights. 
The Galleaos decision makes clear that in Utah, judicial 
resources takes a backseat to a defendant's constitutional rights: 
"The entry of a guilty plea involves the 
waiver of several important constitutional 
rights, including the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to 
trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea 
constitutes such a waiver, and because the 
prosection will generally be unable to show 
that it will suffer any significant prejudice 
if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, 
be liberally granted." Id. at 1042. 
The Gallegos decision is consistent with decisions rendered by 
courts of sister states. For example, in State v. Johnson, 816 
P.2d 364 (Idaho App. 1991), the court stated: 
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"...relief will be granted absent a strong 
showing of prejudice by the state". Id. at 
367. 
State v. Dockery, 821 P.2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1991) where the court 
stated that a withdrawal of the rule interpreting a withdrawal of 
a guilty plea is to be: 
"liberally interpreted, and doubts are to be 
resolved in favor of allowing withdraw of 
plea". Id. at 189. 
Bigpond v. State, Okl.Cr., 463 P.2d 989 in which the court stated 
"The law favors the trial of criminal cases on 
the merits". Id. at 989. 
State v. McAllister, 96 Mont. 348, 30 P.2d 821 in which the court 
stated: 
"If there is any doubt that the plea is not 
voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in his 
favor. On application to change of plea, all 
doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial 
on the merits." 
POINT IV 
DISTINCTIVE DIFFERENCES 
There are other cases cited in appellee's brief that are so 
different than the case at hand that they have no precedential 
value. Appellee contends that in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1985) "the court considered an argument similar to Thorup's" 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 11). In Saunders, the defendant contended 
that a 1977 conviction should not have been considered for the 
purposes of determining whether the defendant was a habitual 
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criminal in a subsequent proceeding. The court held that as all 
procedural requirements were complied with in the 1977 proceeding, 
there was a presumption that the defendant had understood what he 
was doing when he pled guilty. Unlike the instant case, the 
defendant in Saunders never made a motion to withdraw his plea of 
guilty. The defendant in Saunders did not claim, as does the 
defendant in the instant case, that the unrelenting pressure of his 
attorney and his family deprived the defendant of his decision to 
proceed to trial. 
The appellee also claims that the case of United States v. 
Nigro, 262 F.2d 783 (Ct. App. Third Cir. 1959) presents a similar 
fact pattern as in the instant case. Not so. In Nigro, the trial 
court, prior to a change of plea, had been apprised that the 
defendant was entering his guilty pleas as a matter of convenience. 
Prior to accepting Nigro's pleas, the trial judge asked additional 
questions to make certain that Nigro had made a willful decision to 
plead guilty. In the instant case, there was no heightened inquiry 
despite the fact that the defendant's demeanor in court warranted 
an additional inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant Don 
Thorup's motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty. The defendant had 
presented a fair and just reason why the pleas should have been 
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withdrawn. The testimony of the defendant, his family, and his 
former counsel (called as a witness by the appellee) verify the 
intense pressure that was brought to bear against the defendant. 
When his attorney could not convince the defendant to plead guilty, 
he appealed to the defendant as a friend and religious leader. 
Despite the defendant's protestations, former counsel persuaded the 
defendant's family who then brought additional pressure against the 
defendant. This pressure negated the defendant's ability to stand 
by his decision to proceed to trial and allow a jury to determine 
his innocence or guilty. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 1992. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By: H MA^ C^j^S>r^ 
Harry/Gaston 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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